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Abstract: We report the results of a coordination game experiment.  The
experiment carefully distinguishes between conventions based on labels and
conventions based on populations. Our labels treatments investigate the
abstraction assumptions that underlie the concept of a strategy, while our
population treatments investigate the attraction of alternative mutually
consistent ways to play under adaptive behavior. We observe conventions
emerging in communities with one population and labels and with two
populations and no labels, but the most effective treatment is two labeled
populations.
A final section investigates individual subject behavior. Specifically, we
estimate logistic response learning models. Of the models considered, a
version of exponential fictitious play fits our data best.
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and Brandenburger (1992) on the mutual consistency requirement. See Harsanyi/Selten (1988) on
equilibrium selection.
 See also Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1990; 1994) and Friedman (1996).
2
 Roth/Schoumaker (1983) and Binmore, et al. (1993) present evidence against equal-division in
3
asymmetric Nash demand games.
 Of course, they don't claim that security always undermines efficiency and symmetry.  Straub
4
(1995) found that risk-dominance makes more accurate predictions than security in the class of
coordination games he considers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two related problems exist in the theory of equilibrium points. First, the
mutual consistency requirement of an equilibrium assignment is not an
implication of individual rationality, because individual rationality does not
restrict the subjective beliefs a player may hold. Rather, individual rationality
means internal consistency and internally consistent beliefs and actions of
different players may not be mutually consistent. Second, there is often more
than one mutually consistent strategy combination, which results in an
indeterminant analysis. Consequently, understanding the origin of mutually
consistent behavior is an essential complement to the theory of equilibrium
points.
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It is possible to construct a deductive equilibrium selection theory by
introducing abstraction assumptions that go beyond individual rationality and
mutual consistency: assumptions like efficiency, symmetry, and security.
Deductive selection principles select equilibrium points based on thinking
about the description of the game. However, if the deductive approach is to
provide an accurate theory of observable games, the selection principles of
efficiency, symmetry, and security must formalize characteristics that are
commonly known to be psychologically salient.
Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990; 1991) and Van Huyck, Cook, and
Battalio (forthcoming) present evidence against the psychological salience of
efficiency.   Van Huyck et al. (1995) present evidence against the
2
psychological salience of symmetry in symmetric bargaining games.  In these
3
experiments, security undermines the salience of either efficiency or
symmetry.  These facts make us pessimistic about the usefulness of
4
constructing purely deductive selection theories.
Repeated interaction may allow players to learn to coordinate on a mutual
best response outcome. Following Lewis (1969), we distinguish between
historical precedents in repeated games and conventions in evolutionary2
games. Selecting a mutual best response outcome based on precedent requires
actors to focus on some salient analogy to a shared past instance of the present
observable game and to expect others to focus on the same analogy. Crawford
and Haller (1990) explain how players should use precedent to establish a
common language that will allow players to resolve strategic uncertainty in
repeated coordination games. Meyers et al. (1992) found that if subjects do
not use precedent optimally in early periods of the repeated game it was very
difficult for them to learn to do so.
Convention generalizes precedent to situations where one lacks shared
experience, but knows that everyone involved is a member of the same
community. An observable  regularity in the behavior of members of a
community in a recurrent situation is a convention if it is customary, expected,
and mutually consistent, compare Lewis (1969) and Young (1993).
As mentioned above, Van Huyck, et al. (1995) found that security can
undermine the salience of symmetry. Initially, this resulted in outcomes that
were not mutually consistent. However, in one treatment the matching protocol
divided subjects into two labeled populations: a row population and a column
population. In five of eight sessions under this treatment they observed
unequal-division conventions emerging in communities of symmetrically
endowed subjects. In that paper, no distinction was made between conventions
based on labels, the row and column position in the game, and conventions
based on populations, own population players only meet other population
players
This distinction reflects two different sources of mutually consistent
behavior. Labels may serve as a focal point that solves the strategy
coordination problem if their significance is recognized by members of the
community, see Sugden (1995) for references. Alternatively, changing the
matching protocol from one to two populations changes the state space of
models of population dynamics and for many population dynamics this change
has the implication that only strict equilibria are asymptotically stable, see
Weibull (1995) for references. Consequently, inefficient but symmetric mixed
strategy equilibria are no longer asymptotically stable.
This paper attempts to seperate the influence of labels and populations
on the ability of subjects in an evolutionary coordination game to adopt a
conventional way to play. Our labels treatments investigates the abstraction
assumptions that underlie the concept of a strategy, while our population
treatments investigate the attraction of alternative mutually consistent ways to
play under adaptive behavior. We observe conventions emerging in
communities with one population and labels and with two populations and no
labels, but the most effective treatment is two labeled populations.
A final section, added in response to helpful comments by several referees,3
No Labels Labels








10 4 0 Row
Choice
1 0,0 40,40
2 40 0 2 40,40 0,0
Table 1: Earnings table for no labels and labels treatments.
investigates individual subject behavior. Specifically, we estimate logistic
response learning models, like Mookerjee and Sopher (1994) and Cheung and
Friedman (1995). Of the models considered, a version of exponential fictitious
play fits our data best. When estimated by treatment, the exponential fictitious
play models converge toward best response fictitious play as one moves from
the one population no labels treatment to the two labeled population treatment.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to focus the analysis, we use the following generic coordination
game. Two players are matched and asked to choose either a 1 or 2.  If they
choose different numbers, they each earn 40 cents.  If they choose the same
number, they earn nothing.
Table 1 reports the earnings tables used in the experiment.  The main
difference between the two earnings tables is how they are labeled.  In the no
labels treatment, the rows are labeled “your choice” and the columns are
labeled “other participant's choice”.  In  the labels treatment, subjects were
labeled either row or column and the earnings table described their potential
earnings according to “row choice” and “column choice”. We do not mean
anything deeper by the terms ‘no labels’ and ‘with labels’ than this difference
in the experimental design.
Making the usual abstraction assumptions gives a 2×2 game with three
Nash equilibria.  Let p  denote the probability that player one chooses action i
i, where i ￿ {1,2} and let p denote the vector (p, p).  Let q  denote the 12 i
probability that player two chooses action i, where i ￿ {1,2} and let q denote
the vector (q, q).  Player one's strategy vector p is an element of the simplex 12
S  = {x ￿ ￿ | x  ￿ 0, (x = 1, i = 1,2};  as is player two's strategy vector, q ￿
22
ii
S .  A strategy combination is the 4-tuple {p,q}.  The unit coordinate vectors
2
e   ￿ (1,0) and e  ￿ (0,1) denote pure strategies: the actions 1 and 2 12 This game is sometimes called an intersection game, see for example Lewis (1969,p.6), Sugden
5
(1986, Ch.3), Crawford (1991, p.36-38), or Samuelson (1991, p.114).
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)11 )12 )21 )22
)11 0,0 20,20 20,20 40,40
)12 20,20 40,40 0,0 20,20
)21 20,20 0,0 40,40 20,20
)22 40,40 20,20 20,20 0,0
Table 2:  Payoff bi-matrix when strategies are contingent on labels: Game ￿.
respectively.  In this notation, the Nash equilibria are {e, e}, {e, e}, and 12 21
{(½,½),(½,½)}.
Player one's expected payoff is p.G.q and player two's expected payoff is
q.G.p, where G is the payoff matrix corresponding to the earnings tables given
in table 1.  Game G is defined by the following description: G ￿ ￿{1,2},
{p.G.q, q.G.p}, {S ,S }￿.  Game G is symmetric in that the expected payoff
22 5
functions are symmetric and the players' feasible strategies are the same.
Harsanyi/Selten (1988;p.73) argue that symmetry is an “indispensable
requirement for any rational theory of equilibrium point selection that is based
on strategic considerations exclusively.” A strategic analysis of game G that
requires symmetry selects the mixed strategy equilibrium. However, this
equilibrium is inefficient. The expected payoff is half that of either of the
asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. In game G, symmetry conflicts with
efficiency. Restricting attention to the information in G has the advantage that
it allows a general analysis and the disadvantage that it selects an inefficient
equilibrium assignment.
Up to this point we have ignored the differences in how the earnings tables
are labeled.  Doing so is consistent with an analysis that is invariant with
respect to renaming players.  Suppose nature randomly assigns the labels
“row” and “column” to player 1 and 2 and it is commonly understood that
players condition their actions on their labels. Let )  denote the pure strategy ij
“play i if labeled row and j if labeled column.” The strategic form of this two
stage game would no longer be 2×2. The payoff bi-matrix is given in table 2.
Let ￿ denote the 4×4 game represented in table 2. It has four strict
equilibria and an infinite number of mixed strategy equilibria. However, two  See Sugden (1986), Van Damme (1987), Crawford (1991), Friedman (1991), and  Samuelson
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and Zhang (1992).
 We will continue to use the word symmetric in the strategic sense of symmetric payoff functions
7
and identical strategy spaces. Biologists call the one population protocol a symmetric contest and
the two population protocol an asymmetric contest. 
5
of the strict equilibria are both efficient and symmetric. Using notation
analogous to that used in the 2×2 game, the efficient symmetric equilibria are
{e ,e } and {e ,e }. Either both “play 1 when labeled row and 2 when labeled 22 33
column” or “play 2 when labeled row and 1 when labeled column”. Labeling
has not solved the basic strategy coordination problem, since there are two
efficient symmetric equilibria. Instead it forces one to consider how meaning
becomes attached to a ‘strategically’ irrelevant detail of the game.  
III. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
Repeated interaction amongst members of a community may allow a
convention to emerge that solves their strategy coordination problem.  In an
evolutionary game, a constituent game S is played by n actors randomly drawn
from a community C. In general, C will consist of heterogenous populations,
where this heterogeneity may arise either from strategic asymmetries in S or
from non-strategic asymmetries in the matching protocol. Even when S is
played by strangers, the knowledge that they are members of C may allow
them to coordinate on a mutual best response outcome, because members of
C conform to a convention.
How do conventions evolve? An evolutionary analysis focuses on the
distribution of actions in populations of anonymously interacting players.
6
Here we consider two random pairwise matching protocols either of which
could lead to the strategic situation analyzed in section II. In the one
population protocol, players are matched with members of their own
population. In the two population protocol, players are matched with members
of a different population.  The protocol describing how players are matched
7
plays an important part in determining the dimension of the resulting
dynamical system and the stability of the dynamical system's fixed points.
Let s  denote the fraction of population k using action i and let s  denote i
k k
the vector of all s .  All feasible population frequency vectors s  lie on the i
kk
simplex, either  S  without labels or S  with labels.  (Notice that this is the
24
same space as an individual player's strategy space.)  The state space equals
S  in the one population no labels case, S  in the one population with labels
24
case, S  × S  in the two population no labels case, and S ×S  in the two
22 4 4￿ si ￿ si(ei.A.s ￿ s.A.s), ~i.
 The stability concept used in this paper is asymptotic stability, see Hirsch and Smale (1974).
8
  See Borgers/Sarin (1993) for  analysis of learning models that give rise to replicator dynamics.
9
See Weibull (1995) for a model of imitation that gives rise to replicator dynamics.
6
population with labels case.  Let s denote an element of the state space.
A model of adaptive behavior specifies how a state s evolves through
time.  Let s(t) denote the state at time t.  An admissible dynamical system,
ds/dt = F(s), generates a unique solution curve s(t) from given initial
conditions  s(0)  ￿  S.  F(&) is itself derived from a payoff matrix, assumptions
about adaptive behavior, and the matching protocol.  A state s is a fixed point
of F(&) if all components of F(s) are 0.  The state s is a fixed point in the sense
that if s(0) is a fixed point of F(&), then F(s(0)) = 0 and s(t) = s(0) for all t >
0.  A state s* is a stable fixed point of F(&) if F(s*) = 0 and it has an open
neighborhood N G S such that s(t) ￿ s* as t ￿ ￿ whenever s(0) ￿ N.  T h e
8
union of all solution curves that tend toward s* as t ￿ ￿ is called the basin of
attraction of s* and is denoted by B(s*).
A dynamical system provides a theory of the origin of convention in the
following sense:  Given an initial state s(0) with solution curve s(t) ￿ B(s*),
the dynamic predicts that after a transition period every state will stay so close
to s* as to be indistinguishable from it. When s* is consistent with a strict
equilibrium of the related game, the dynamic predicts the emergence of the
specific convention s*.  Hence, the theory predicts whether and, if so, which
convention will emerge using information on the games description, the
matching protocol, the initial state s(0), and assumptions about adaptive
behavior.
Replicator dynamics arise if the growth rate of a behavior in a population
is equal to its relative “fitness.”    Assume that the “fitness” of an action is
9
equal to its expected payoff in the current state. Let A denote a payoff matrix.
The expected payoff for a player using action i with one population is e. A . s. i
The average expected payoff in state s is s.A.s. Hence, the replicator dynamic
for payoff matrix A with one population is given by the following system of
non-linear differential equations:
We are interested in finding the stable fixed points of this system and the basin
of attraction of the stable fixed points.  From the biology literature, we know
that the stable fixed points of the replicator dynamic are a subset of the Nash








Figure 1: Solution paths of replicator dynamic for game G with one population and
no labels, where p[t] is the proportion of the population playing action 1 at time t.
than attempting to derive closed form solutions for the dynamical systems
considered in this paper, we will rely mainly on phase portrait methods and
numerical analysis: specifically, the Runge-Kutta method described in Maeder
(1990, p.172).
Figure 1 graphs the solution paths of the one population replicator
dynamic for game G. The dynamic converges to the globally stable fixed point
(½,½), which corresponds to the mixed strategy equilibrium of G, for all
interior initial states. Hence, the replicator dynamic selects the inefficient but
symmetric equilibrium without multiple populations or labels.
Figure 2 graphs the phase diagram of the replicator dynamic for game ￿
with one population and labels. The 4 dimensional state space can be
represented by a three dimensional tetrahedron, where a point is the vector
(s, s, s), using the restriction that s  = 1-s +s +s  to infer the frequency of 123 4 1 2 3
strategy ) . The figure is a two dimensional representation of the tetrahedron. 22
It is being viewed from the point (1,1,1) and the hidden vertex is (0,0,0),
which corresponds to the state where all members of the population use
strategy ) . 22(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
8
Figure 2:  Simulated paths of the one population replicator dynamic for game ￿.
The stable fixed points of the one population replicator dynamic for game
￿ are (0,1,0,0) and (0,0,1,0), which corresponds to the two symmetric efficient
equilibria of game ￿. The dynamic divides the tetrahedron into two equal sized
basins of attraction separated by a plane connecting the points {(1,0,0),
(0,0,0), (0,½,½)}. Hence, the dynamic predicts that the convention that will
emerge in the evolutionary game will depend on the historical accident of the
initial state. Specifically, observing the initial state allows one to predict
whether the convention will be “play 1 when labeled row and 2 when labeled
column” or “play 2 when labeled row and 1 when labeled column.”
Notice also that the mixed strategy (¼,¼,¼,¼), which conditional on a
player's label is equivalent to the equilibrium mixed strategy of game G, is









i (ei.A.s 1 ￿ s 2.A.s 1), ~i.
9
dynamic.  The dynamic predicts that ignoring one's label is not stable.  In other
words, members of the community will learn to use their labels to solve the
strategy coordination problem.
In the two population case, the expected payoff to a player choosing an
action depends on his membership in either population. In the experiment
these populations were refered to as “your” and “other”. For notational
convenience index the populations with 1 and 2. The expected payoff to action
i  for a member of population 1 is e. A . s, while the expected payoff to action i
2
i for a member of population 2 is e. A . s. In state s, the average expected i
1
payoff for population 1 is s .A.s  and for population 2 is s .A.s . Hence, the
12 21
replicator dynamic for payoff matrix A with two populations is given by the
following system of differential equations:
Figure 3 graphs the phase diagram for the two population replicator
dynamic for game G. The 45( line divides the state space into two basins of
attraction. The fixed point {(½,½),(½,½)}, which was stable under one
population,  lies on the separatrix and, hence, is now unstable. The stable fixed
points are {e ,e } and {e ,e }, which correspond to the strict equilibria of game 12 21
G. The dynamic converges to a state in which all members of population 1
adopt one action and all of the members of population 2 adopt the other action.
Notice that this solution does not require labels or even that players are aware
of how the matching protocol allows them to solve the strategy coordination
problem.
The shaded regions of figure 3 denote that region of a stable fixed point's
basin of attraction in which, given what others are doing, all players have an
incentive to conform to the convention. When a state is contained within this
region we will say that a convention has emerged, just as one says that it is an
American convention to drive on the right side of the road even thought
everyone knows that there are drunk drivers on the road. As Lewis (1969)
argued, it is useful and important to distinguish between degrees of conformity
to a convention. Here we will measure conformity by the minimum with
respect to labels or populations of the percent of actions conforming to the









Figure 3:  Phase diagram of replicator dynamic for game G with two populations and
no labels.  p denotes the proportion of population 1 playing action 1 and q denotes the
proportion of population 2 playing action 1.
The two population replicator dynamic for game ￿ has eight dimensions
and is messy to analyze.  Fortunately, labels and populations were perfectly
correlated in the experiment and imposing this condition collapses the system
to that depicted in figure 3.  We will refer to this treatment as two labeled
populations.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
An essential feature of the above analysis is the ability to alter the state
space of the dynamic either by having players condition on labels or by
altering the matching protocol. As emphasized by Bacharach (1993) and
Sugden (1995), the strategy space in an observable game depends on how the
players describe the situation to themselves. For example, it may or may not
occur to a subject to condition their action on their label. A crucial design issue








1N o O n e7 58
2N o O n e7 58
3N o O n e7 58
4Y e s O n e 7 58
5Y e s O n e 4 58
6Y e s O n e 4 58
7 No Two 45 14
8 No Two 45 14
9 No Two 45 14
10 Yes Two 30 14
11 Yes Two 45 14
12 Yes Two 45 14
Table 3: Experimental design.
be more interesting to allow subjects to discover the map between labels and
actions on their own. Hence, we only elicited actions.  Human  subjects  played
the generic coordination game either with or without labels and under a one or
two population protocol.  Eight subjects participated in each one population
session and fourteen subjects participated in each two population session:
seven subjects in each population.  Table 3 summarizes the experimental
design.
The subjects had complete information about both their own and
everybody else's earnings table. They chose actions 1 or 2 each period. The
subjects’ actions were then randomly paired to determine an outcome for each
pair. The subjects were informed that they were being randomly paired. Since
outcomes were reported privately, subjects could not use common information
about the outcomes in previous periods to coordinate on an equilibrium.
Subjects confronted an anonymous participant each period.
Monetary payments were used to induce preferences. The number in the
cell {i,j} of the earnings table denotes the number of cents earned by a subject
given they chose action i and the other participant they were currently paired
with chose action j, see table 1. Subjects were instructed on how to derive the The instructions are available at http://econlab10.tamu.edu/JVH_gtee/.
10
12
other participant's earnings from the earnings table.  
No preplay communication of any kind was allowed. Messages were sent
electronically on a PC-network.
The subjects were recruited from undergraduate economic classes at Texas
A&M University in the fall of 1992. A total of 132 subjects participated in the
experiment. After reading the instructions, but before the session began, the
subjects filled out a questionnaire to determine that they understood how to
read earnings tables. In the forty-five period sessions, which take about one
and a half hours to conduct, a subject could earn as much as $18. In the
seventy-five period sessions, which take about two hours to conduct, a subject
could earn as much as $30.
10
IV.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The results are reported in five sections: Section A reports the one
population no labels treatment: sessions 1 to 3; Section B reports the one
population with labels treatment: sessions 4 to 6; Section C reports the two
populations without labels treatment: sessions 7 to 9; Section D reports the
two labeled populations treatment: sessions 10 to 12. Section E reports logistic
models of individual behavior.
A. One Population no Labels.
Figure 4 reports the frequency of action 1 summed over five period
intervals for the one population no labels sessions. Since there are 8 subjects
per session, the frequency can range from 0 to 40. The solid horizontal line at
20 denotes the predicted equilibrium frequency, compare with figure 1. The
horizontal axis measures periods.
Behavior in both the early and late periods stayed around the predicted
equilibrium frequency.  Although, it did drift off for short periods of time.
Strictly speaking this violates the replicator dynamic and, more generally,  any
order compatible dynamic, see Friedman (1991). These violations are even
more pronounced in the period by period population frequency data.
Deviations from the predicted frequency persist. A formal analysis of the


































































 Catagorize observations into those with action 1 fractions less than, equal to, or greater than the
11
expected fraction of 0.5. The predicted transition matrix is {{0.13,0.101,0.13},
{0.101,0.078,0.101}, {0.13,0.101,0.13}} and the observed transition matrix was
{{0.063,0.081,0.117}, {0.113,0.113,0.117}, {0.087,0.144,0.167}}. The Chi-Square statistic is
22.7, which exceeds the critical value of 14.9 at the one percent level of statistical significance.
Meyers, et al. (1992) report similar results.
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Figure 4:  Sessions 1 to 3, one pop. no labels.
generated by players using the
equilibrium mixed strategy of
the constituent game G.  The
11
persistence is asymmetric with
states above the equilibrium
frequency being three times as
likely to persist as states below
the equilibrium frequency.
With a population of eight
subjects in the evolutionary
game, it is possible to purify
the mixed strategy equilibrium:
four subjects choose 1 and four
choose 2.  Examination of the
individual subject data reveals
that the subjects fail to
coordinate on this sort of a
convention.  
Average period earnings
for the one population no labels
treatment equaled $0.20.  These
observed earnings coincide with
predicted earnings under the
mixed strategy equilibrium of
the constituent game G out to
the third decimal place.  Hence,
theory predicts earnings


































  Session 4 certainly mislead us into cutting the number of periods from 75 in session 4 to 30 in
12
the next session, which is labeled 10 in the text.
14
Figure 5:  Sessions 4 to 6, one pop. with labels
B. One Population with Labels.
Figure 5 reports the
frequency of action 1 summed
over five period intervals for
the one population with labels
sessions.  Actions taken by
subjects labeled row are
reported on the horizontal axis
and actions taken by subjects
labeled column are reported on
the vertical axis.  Eight
subjects made five choices in
each five period interval.
These actions are classified by
label.  Since there was a
subject labeled row for every
subject labeled column, the
frequency measured on both
axes can range from 0 to 20.
The symmetric efficient
equilibria are represented by
the corners {20,0} and {0,20}
in figure 5.  The expected
frequency under a mixed
strategy equilibrium is
{10,10}.
In session 4, subjects
learned to use their labels to
solve their coordination
problem within ten periods.
After ten periods, all eight
subject conform to the
convention “if labeled row this
period play 1 and if labeled
column this period play 2.” So the degree of conformity is 100 percent. While
the result is a dramatic example of the origin of convention, it does not seem
to be representative.
1215
Session 5 wanders within the area in which all subjects have an incentive
to conform to the convention “if labeled row this period play 2 and if labeled
column this period play 1,” but subjects fail to coordinate on the
corresponding equilibrium. For the last five periods of session 5, the degree of
conformity is only 70 percent. In session 6, behavior wandered around the
unstable mixed strategy equilibrium and no convention emerged, that is,
subjects ignored their labels just as if they thought that labels should be
strategically irrelevant.
Average period earnings in session 4 were $0.39, which is only $0.01 less
than earnings predicted by a pure strategy equilibrium. Average period
earnings in session 5 were $0.23  Average period earnings in session 6 were
$0.20, which is equal to average earnings without labels and to earnings













































Figure 6:  Sessions 7 to 9, two pop. no labels.
C. Two Populations without Labels.
Figure 6 reports the
frequency of action 1 summed
over five period intervals for
the two populations no labels
treatment. There were seven
subjects in population 1 and
seven subjects in population 2.
The horizontal axis measures
the frequency of action 1 in
population 1 and the vertical
axis measures the frequency of
action 1 in population 2.  These
frequencies can range from 0 to
35. The efficient equilibria are
represented by the points
{35,0} and {0,35}.  The
expected frequency under the
mixed strategy equilibrium is
{17.5,17.5}, compare figure 3.
In session 7, subjects
solved their coordination
problem by adopting an action.
This is possible because in a
two population protocol one
never meets members of one's
own population. After period
15, all fourteen subjects
conformed to the convention
"members of population 1
always play 2 and members of
population 2 always play 1."
The degree of conformity is 100
percent.
In session 9, behavior co-evolved towards the same convention and it was
in everyone’s interest to conform, but subjects did not coordinate on the
underlying equilibrium within the 45 periods allowed. In the last five periods
of session 9, the degree of conformity is 89 percent.
In session 8, behavior wandered around the unstable mixed strategy
equilibrium.  













































Figure 7: Sessions 10 to 12, two labeled pop.
and in session 9 were $0.28.  So the failure to coordinate on a convention costs
subjects about half their earnings.
D. Two Labeled Populations.
Figure 7 reports the
frequency of action 1 over five
period intervals for the two
labeled population sessions.
The seven subjects in
population 1 were labeled row
and the seven subjects in
population 2 were labeled
column. The horizontal axis
measures the frequency of
action 1 in the row population
and the vertical axis measures
the frequency of action 1 in the
column population. These
frequencies can range from 0 to
35. The efficient equilibria are
represented by the points
{35,0} and {0,35}. The
expected frequency under the
mixed strategy equilibrium is
{17.5,17.5},  compare figure 3.
A convention emerged in
all three sessions of the two
labeled populations treatment.
In session 12, subjects actually
coordinate on the constituent
equilibrium for the last ten
periods of the session.  Subjects
solved their coordination
problem by adopting an action.
In sessions 10 and 11, all
subjects had a monetary
incentive to conform to the convention "members of the row population play
2 and members of the column population play 1." The degree of conformity
was 86 percent and 77 percent respectively. After period 35 in session 12, all
fourteen subjects conformed to the convention "members of the row




ait￿1, t ￿ 2,
 See Fudenberg and Levine (1996) for a survey of this growing literature.
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degree of conformity was 100 percent.
Average period earnings in session 10 were $0.25, in session 11 were
$0.22, and in session 12 were $0.27.
The replicator dynamic provides a tractable analytical framework in which
the influence of non-strategic details on behavior in an evolutionary game can
be illustrated, but, while its gross predictions are fairly accurate, it makes a
number of inaccurate predictions.  The rate of change in a strategy is not
proportional to its extant frequency as assumed by the replicator dynamic.
Behavior is stochastic rather than deterministic. Moreover, as shown in the
next section, behavior depends on more than the current population
frequencies.
Also, it is unclear whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is really
unstable as predicted by the replicator dynamic, see sessions 6 and 8. Instead,
what appears to happen is that subjects get caught in the sort of correlated
cycles, “cob webs”, predicted by myopic belief learning models although for
short periods of time only. The population frequencies are close to the
predicted frequencies but average earnings suffer during these episodes.
E. Logistic Response Models of Subject Behavior.
While the replicator dynamic provides a useful model of population
dynamics, it does not provide a model of individual subject behavior. In this
section, we report estimates of two belief learning models. Popular belief
learning models consist of two components: a response function and an
assessment rule.  For example, fictitious play consists of a best response
13
function and an assessment rule based on the historical frequency of actions.
Our first empirical model of subject behavior is like fictitious play except
that the best response function is replaced with the logistic response function
f(•). Let y  denote subject i’s assessment of the likelyhood his opponent will it
play action 1 in period t. For a history of observed actions h  = (a , a , ...,a it i1 i2 it-
),  y  is given by 1i t
where a  is 1 if subject i’s opponent choose action 1 in period t and zero it
otherwise. Let y  equal 0.5. For the one population with labels treatment, the i1
belief variable is conditioned on the subject’s label, that is, the equation ispit ￿ f(￿i ￿ ￿i yit).
ˆ ￿i,ˆ ￿i
￿ ￿ ￿i ￿ ˆ ￿i and ￿ ￿ ￿i ￿ ˆ ￿i
 This distinction between protocols that make it easy to exploit adaptive behavior and those that
14
don’t is demonstrated nicely in Bloomfield (1994).
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iterated on the subsample of the subject’s experience when labeled row and on
the subsample of the subject’s experience when labeled column. The value for
y  in the current period is that value from the subsample with the subject’s it
current label.
The probability subject i plays action 1, p , is given by the following it
model of fictitious play, FP:
The estimated FP model breaks the parameters ￿ , ￿  into a representative ii
component  ￿,  ￿ and an idiosyncratic component  , that is,
. The model was estimated using the
logistic procedure in SAS version 6.11. Variables were chosen for inclusion in
the model using the forward selection option of the logistic procedure, which
adds variables iteratively according to the score chi-square statistic until there
are no variables that pass the five percent statistical significance rule of thumb.
Table 4 reports the representative component of the estimated model by
treatment and for all 132 subjects combined, where pop denotes population
and lab denotes labels, std denotes standard error, n denotes number of
observations, df denotes degrees of freedom, 3  denotes chi-square statistic for
2
the global hypothesis that all ￿s are zero, and p-value denotes the probability
value given the chi-square statistic and degrees of freedom. The table does not
report the idiosyncratic components of the fitted model, but by subtracting 2
from df one can deduce the number of idiosyncratic components. For example,
the one population no labels fitted model has 15 idiosyncratic components. 
The belief variable y  is highly significant in all four treatments. it
Moreover, the absolute value of the point estimate increases  from 6.01 for the
one population no labels treatment to 11.46 for the two labeled populations
treatment.
The one population no labels results contrast sharply with Mookherjee and
Sopher (1994,p.82) who did not find evidence for fictitious play in an
experiment with very similar best response functions. We conjecture that this
difference may be due to the different matching protocols used. They used a
repeated pairs protocol and we used an evolutionary matching protocol. An
inertial dynamic, like fictitious play, is much more difficult to exploit in an
evolutionary matching protocol than in a repeated pairs protocol.
14pit ￿ f(￿i ￿ ￿i R(yit)).
 The EFP model differs from Cheung and Friedman’s (1995,p.7) belief learning model in that it
15
uses the logit rather than the normit  function, a diffuse prior belief in the first period, and no
history discounting.
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The one population no labels fitted model is the only one that passes the
Hosmer/Lemeshow goodness-of-fit (HL) test used in the logistic procedure.
Cheung and Friedman (1995) report some success with belief learning models
that depend on expected payoff differences between the two actions of a 2×2
game, that is, let R(y ) = {1,-1}.G.{y , 1-y }. We estimated the following it it it
model of exponential fictious play, EFP:
When ￿  is zero, it is straight forward to show that this is Fudenberg and i
Levine’s (1996,p.147) model of exponential fictious play.
15
Table 5 reports the fitted EFP model. Notice that  ￿ does not differ in a
statistically significant way from 0 in any treatment, and that ￿ is highly
significant in all cases. The point estimate for ￿ increases  from 0.096 for the
one population no labels treatment to 0.273 for the two labeled populations
treatment.
In order to compare the effect of transforming the belief variable into the
expected payoff difference variable, figure 8 graphs the estimated FP and EFP
models by treatment. In all four cases the EFP model is closer to the best reply
function than the FP model. The figure also illustrates how moving from one
population no labels to one population with labels to two populations no labels
to two labeled populations twists both estimated models closer to the best
response function.
The EFP model passes the HL test for all treatments, except two labeled
populations. We tried several ways to get a better fit. Allowing the forward
option of the logistic procedure to select between the expected payoff
difference and the historically experienced payoff difference does not change
the estimated model, since the historically experienced payoff difference
variable is not included in the model by the procedure. (So stimulus-response
models do not fit this data as well as the EFP model.) Also, the procedure
when allowed to include a dummy variable for population in the model does
not do so. Own and other lagged choice variables are statistically signficant.
However, including own and other lagged choice variables neither changes the The estimated ￿ drops from 0.273 to 0.212 when own and other lagged choice variables are
16
included in the model.
 The estimated ￿’s are 0.079, 0.169, 0.260, 0.252 respectively. Also, the procedure when
17
allowed to include a period variable does not do so.
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point estimate for ￿ much nor solves the lack of fit problem.
16
If the EFP model is estimated by session rather than treatment, both
sessions 11 and 12 pass the HL test. So it is session 10 that is giving the
model trouble. One’s initial reaction might be that session 10 is failing the HL
test because it is short: only 30 periods. This is not true however. Truncating
the samples at period 30 and re-estimating the EFP model by treatment has
only minor effects on the parameter estimates.  Ironically, the p-value of the
17
HL statistic rises to 0.046 when the EFP model is estimated on the two labeled
population 30 period sample, which is the closest we got to passing the test for
the two labeled population treatment.22
Table 4: Parameter Estimates for the FP Model
Treat. ￿￿nd f3 p-value
pop lab (std)( std)
2
one no 2.873 -6.012 1800 17 489 0.00
(0.34) (0.63)
one yes 4.787 -9.406 1320 18 898 0.00
(0.32) (0.57)
two no 4.728 -10.081 1890 21 1164 0.00
(0.27) (0.55)
two yes 5.662 -11.463 1680 24 745 0.00
(0.33) (0.64)
all 4.615 -9.536 6690 71 3270 0.00
(0.15) (0.28)
Table 5: Parameter Estimates for the EFP Model
Treat. ￿￿nd f 3 p-value
pop lab (std)( std)
2
one no -0.115 0.096 1800 18 519 0.00
(0.077) (0.0089)
one yes 0.143 0.172 1320 20 956 0.00
(0.11) (0.015)
two no -0.044 0.249 1890 30 1247 0.00
(0.10) (0.025)
two yes -0.084 0.273 1680 35 852 0.00
(0.090) (0.020)
all -0.003 0.214 6690 104 3580 0.00












































b. One population with labels
d. Two labeled populations
a. One population no labels
c. Two populations no labels
Figure 8: Estimated fictitious play (fp) and exponential fictitious play (efp) models.24
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Table 6 summarizes the results. Without non-strategic details, the
outcome was inefficient as predicted by symmetry. Labeling subjects row or
column but holding the number of populations constant at one allowed two of
three sessions to coordinate on a convention, which improved efficiency.  Two
of three sessions under the two population no labels treatment coordinated on
a convention, which also improved efficiency.  A convention emerged in all
three sessions of the two labeled populations treatment.  It is in this sense that
it was the most effective treatment. The experiment demonstrates that it is
possible for conventions based on labels or on populations to emerge.
We were pleasantly surprised by the ability of the exponential fictitious
play model to fit our individual subject data. The experiment was designed and
conducted before Fudenberg and Krep’s (1993) published their seminal work
on smooth fictitious play. Yet, of the numerous empirical models we have
tried, this is the first which seems close to being right to us. We will certainly
















1 {22,18} None {19,21} None -- $0.19
2 {18,22} None {20,20} None -- $0.22
3 {19,21} None {26,14} None -- $0.20
One Pop/Labels
4 {16,4,5,15} {e ,e } 12 {20,0,0,20} {e ,e } 12 100 $0.39
5 {5,15,11,9} {e ,e } 21 {6,14,14,6} {e ,e } 21 70 $0.23
6 {9,11,8,12} {e ,e } 12 {12,8,10,10} None -- $0.20
Two Pop/No Labels
7 {6,29,24,11} {e ,e } 21 {0,35,35,0} {e ,e } 21 100 $0.37
8 {17,18,11,24} {e ,e } 12 {18,17,20,15} None -- $0.17
9 {14,21,23,12} {e ,e } 21 {2,33,31,4} {e ,e } 21 89 $0.28
Two Pop/Labels
10 {16,19,18,17} {e ,e } 21 {2,33,30,5} {e ,e } 21 86 $0.25
11 {16,19,19,16} {e ,e } 21 {8,27,29,6} {e ,e } 21 77 $0.22
12 {24,11,15,20} {e ,e } 12 {35,0,0,35} {e ,e } 12 100 $0.27
Table 4:  Summary table.  Ses denotes session.  Pop. denotes population.  Conv.
denotes convention.  The vectors report either the frequency of action 1 and 2 or the
freqeuncy of action 1 and 2 by label or population or both. Deg. of Conf. denotes
degree of conformity.26
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